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BROWN ON MACKIE: ECHOES OF THE LOTTERY PARADOX 
David Faraci 
 
Phil Brown (2011) considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a 
necessary or contingent thesis.  The question is inspired, in part, by Christian Coons’ 
(2011) argument that error theory can be true only if it is necessarily true in a world 
like ours.  Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie 
(1977)—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory.  
Brown writes: 
Assume that Mackie is right both about the diversity of moral 
opinions at different times and places and about the best explanation 
of this fact. Then any world that is a non-moral duplicate of our own 
will be one at which there is a diversity of moral opinions that is best 
explained in the way that Mackie explains it. Unless we think we 
should believe some explanation for the diversity of moral opinions 
other than the best one, then we should conclude that [the claim that 
there “is a possible world W, identical to the actual world in all non-
moral respects, where there are moral facts”] is false. (Brown 2011, 3, 
bracketed quote at 2) 
This argument appears to be of the following general form:  Consider an 
abductive argument for non-modal conclusion C—an argument according to which 
C1 is the best explanation, in the actual world (WA), for some given fact, F.  (In 
Brown’s argument, F is the diversity of moral opinions and C is error theory.)  Now 
consider the set of possible worlds W, each of which is exactly like WA in all respects 
relevant to that abductive argument.2  It follows, it seems, that C is true at each W-
world.  For if C is the best explanation for F in WA, and each W-world is identical to 
WA in all relevant respects, then C is the best explanation for F in each W-world.  
Given the justificatory force of abductive reasoning—i.e., given that we may conclude 
that C (at WA) from the premise that C is the best explanation of F (at WA)—it seems 
we may likewise conclude that C at each W-world given that C is the best explanation 
                                                 
1 For simplicity’s sake I will use “C” to refer both to the conclusion and the facts described therein.  
Thus I will refer, for example, to worlds that are identical to the actual world “with the possible 
exception of C,” rather than “with the possible exception of the facts described in C.” 
2 That is, each W-world must possess those features of WA that ensure that C is F’s best 
explanation at WA.  Note that this will never require one to initially hold C constant across W, as 
C cannot be a premise in an argument for itself.   Brown takes care of this caveat by talking about 
worlds that are non-morally identical to WA, which allows for the initial appearance that error 
theory might be false at such worlds even if it were true at WA. 
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for F in each such world.  And, of course, we may conclude that C is the best 
explanation of F in each W-world from the fact that C is the best explanation of F in 
WA—for again worlds in W and WA are identical in all relevant respects.  Therefore 
it seems we may conclude C is true at all worlds in W. 
By switching contexts, it becomes clear just how troubling Brown’s argument 
is.  Consider a recently estranged couple.  It may well be that the best explanation for 
my seeing them walking hand-in-hand is that they have reconciled.  And it may well 
be that, having recognized this fact, I have license to believe that they have reconciled.  
But surely it would be extreme for me to conclude that they have reconciled in all 
possible worlds like this one.  Indeed, this further conclusion seems not merely 
unjustified, but obviously false—after all, one of the defining features of abduction as 
a form of non-deductive reasoning is that its conclusions are not necessitated by its 
premises, that the couple’s reconciliation is the best possible explanation of what I 
saw but not the only one.3  Yet unless Brown means to be picking out some special 
aspect of the error-theoretic case that I have overlooked, the stronger modal 
conclusion about the couple’s reconciliation is no more nor less justified than his own 
modal conclusion about Mackie’s error theory. 
That Brown’s argument can be extended as above to the case of the couple 
seems to me a sufficient reductio of that argument.  Nevertheless, the argument 
deserves a closer look, I believe, because though clearly problematic, it is not 
immediately clear what is wrong with arguments of this form aside from the 
(obviously important) fact that they tend to generate false conclusions.  Consider: 
1. From the premise that C is the best explanation for F in WA, one 
may conclude that C in WA. 
2. If C is the best explanation for F in WA and each W-world is 
identical to WA in all relevant4 respects, then C is the best explanation 
for F in each W-world. 
3. Therefore, if C is the best explanation for F in WA and each W-
world is identical to WA in all relevant respects, one may conclude 
that C at WA and at each W-world. 5 
                                                 
3 For discussion and references, see Douven (2011).  
4 Again, this means each W-world must have all those features of WA that make it the case that C 
is the best explanation for F in WA.  And, again, these features cannot include C itself lest the 
abductive argument be blatantly question-begging.  
5 It is worth noting that this argument does not depend on the reasoning’s being abductive .  
Indeed, it seems it can be generalized to apply to all forms of non-deductive reasoning and to a 
possibly broader range of possible worlds, roughly as follows: 
3 
 
I will simply assume that (1)—a general (though imprecise) statement of the 
justificatory force of abductive reasoning—is true.6  (2), if anything, is even more 
intuitive than (1).  After all, whatever features of WA make it the case that C is F’s 
best explanation at WA, those features obtain at each W-world.   
A more promising strategy, perhaps, would be to challenge the move to (3).  
But the only grounds for doing so, it seems, would be an insistence that abductive 
reasoning is somehow limited to the actual world, thus undermining (3) as a natural 
extension of (1).   
One might propose that abduction can only reach conclusions at the actual 
world.  But this is wholly unmotivated.  Suppose you and I are discussing the recently 
estranged couple, and I tell you that I saw them holding hands.  “I saw the same 
thing,” you reply, “they must have gotten back together.”  I agree with your 
conclusion.  But, I muse, should our doppelgangers in a world otherwise identical to 
this one reach the same conclusion if they’ve seen the two holding hands and eating 
ice cream?  If we insist that abductive reasoning is limited to conclusions at the actual 
world, it seems you should reply that you have no idea what, if anything, our 
doppelgangers should conclude in that possible world.  Yet assuming that their eating 
ice cream is irrelevant to our shared conclusion, this response seems patently bizarre.  
You ought to reply that of course our doppelgangers should reach the same conclusion 
we have, for they would have just the same evidence as we do that the (doppelganger) 
couple has gotten back together.  
Alternatively, one might suggest that abduction can only employ premises or 
reach conclusions about the actual world?  This is less clear.  On the one hand, it 
seems right to say that because abductive inferences are non-necessary, precisely 
what I am doing is inferring one thing about the actual world from another, but 
denying that I know whether my conclusion holds in similar possible worlds.  So 
given the discussion of doppelgangers above, we might say that abduction licenses 
the same conclusions at relevantly similar possible worlds, but not about them.  On 
the other hand, it seems rather bizarre to say, “My doppelganger who saw the couple 
                                                 
1. From set of features S of WA, one has license to conclude (through non-deductive reasoning) 
that C in WA.  
2. For any world W*, if W* has features S, one is warranted in concluding that C in W*. 
3. Therefore, if one is warranted in concluding that C in WA on the basis of S, one is warranted in 
concluding that C is true in any world with features S. 
6 This is in no way a careful statement of how abductive reasoning functions.  Indeed, many would 
argue that abduction licenses something other than “pure” belief in C—perhaps an increase in 
credence, or a belief in C’s probability or approximate truth.  While such adjustments would make 
matters more complicated, I do not believe they would have any significant impact on my 
conclusions.  Indeed, I think that this argument applies to any plausible form of non-deductive 
reasoning, no matter how it is formulated.  See note 5, above. 
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holding hands and eating ice cream should believe that they have reconciled; but I 
should believe no such thing.”  Yet this is precisely what one should say if abduction 
were limited in this way.  What’s more, it seems there may be cases in which we do 
want to use abductive arguments to draw conclusions about other possible worlds, 
such as in arguments for modal realism.  It has even been argued that our epistemic 
access to modal facts is centrally abductive.7  So it is plausible that a general 
restriction against abductive arguments for conclusions about other possible worlds 
is unwarranted.8 
I am genuinely uncertain what we should say about this restriction at the end 
of the day.  In the interests of charity, then, I will assume that no such restriction 
exists.  Of course, if it does, then Brown’s argument fails, just for different reasons 
than proposed below. 
Here is where we stand:  If we assume that abductive reasoning has 
justificatory force, it seems we may conclude from error theory’s being the best 
explanation for moral disagreement that error theory is true (in the actual world).  
And it seems that this bit of reasoning would work for any world that is not relevantly 
different from the actual world.  Thus, there is a set of possible worlds—minimally, 
one that includes all worlds non-morally identical to our own—for which we may 
conclude, in each case, that error theory is true.  But, of course, this is not the whole 
story.  In order for Brown’s argument to go through, from (3) we must be able to 
infer: 
4. Therefore, if C is the best explanation for F in WA, one may 
conclude that C is necessarily true across set W+, which includes WA 
and all worlds in set W.  
At first glance, this inference seems unassailable.  After all, according to (3) 
we have license to believe that error theory is true at each W-world.  Given that what 
it is for a proposition to be necessary across a set of possible worlds is just for it to be 
true at each one, the move to (4) seems nearly trivial.  But there is a suppressed 
premise.  In order to conclude that error theory is necessary, we must conclude not 
only that it is true at each possible world, but that it is true at all of them.  That is, 
from C at WA, C at W1, C at W2, etc., we must conclude that (C at WA & W1 & W2…).  
In short, we must agglomerate our beliefs. 
The most famous challenge to belief agglomeration is Henry Kyburg’s (1961) 
“lottery paradox.”9  Briefly:  It seems that given the extraordinarily low probability of 
                                                 
7 See Biggs (2011).  
8 My thanks to John Basl both for raising this issue and for helpful discussion on how to address 
it. 
9 My thanks to Christian Coons for first noting the relevance of the lottery paradox. 
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any particular lottery ticket’s winning, one may conclude of any particular ticket that 
it will not win.  By agglomerating these beliefs, one would come to believe that all 
lottery tickets will not win, and thus that no ticket will.  But, of course, one also 
believes (correctly) that one of the tickets will win.  So it appears that agglomeration 
leads to belief in a contradiction.  While there are other ways out, Kyburg rejects 
agglomeration, and further examples, such as Mackinson’s (1965) “preface paradox,” 
seem to vindicate this choice. 
I submit that Brown has unwittingly provided us with a new and 
independently interesting demonstration of the problem with belief agglomeration—
one that may in fact be more powerful than the lottery paradox itself.  If (as suggested 
above) abductive arguments are not limited in any way to the actual world, then such 
arguments in the actual world can be applied to relevantly similar worlds.  Thus, if I 
have license to believe that error theory is actually true on the basis of an abductive 
argument, it seems I have similar license to believe that it is true at any given possible 
world that is relevantly similar to our own (which will include, minimally, any world 
that is non-morally identical to this one).   
All of this seems correct.  And yet we do not have license to believe that the 
conclusions of abductive arguments are necessary across sets of possible worlds.  The 
only plausible solution, I submit, is to admit that just as we may believe that each 
ticket will lose but not that all will, we may believe that error theory is true in each 
world like ours but not that it is true in all of them.  This result is strange, and it is 
counterintuitive, but without it, Brown’s argument could plausibly serve as a premise 
in a reductio of abduction itself, for abductive reasoning—indeed, I believe, non-
deductive reasoning of any kind—would lead to contradiction. 
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